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A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for diversity.
This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who have
built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system. At stake in
this case as I see it is the preservation of a small aspect of this diversity.
But that aspect is by no means insignificant, given our heritage of avail-
able choice between single-sex and coeducational institutions of higher
learning.'
I. Introduction
In early 1991, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department
received a letter from a female high school student in Northern Virginia
complaining that the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI's) 150-plus-year-old
admissions policy denied her the right to attend the institution because of her
sex. Subsequently, the Justice Department filed suit against VMI, claiming
that the publicly financed, all-male admissions program violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ensuing litigation has
had both a liability stage (VMI 1),2 at which VMI lost, and a remedy stage
(VMI!!),3 at which VMI won. The liability stage dealt with whether VMI's
all-male admissions policy, in the context of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia's system of higher education as presently constituted, violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The remedy stage dealt with the Commonwealth's
proposal to establish a publicly funded, all-female leadership program within
Mary Baldwin College to remedy the constitutional violation identified at the
liability stage.
After a six-day trial on liability commencing on April 4, 1991, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Virginia entered judgment for the
Commonwealth.4 In reaching this judgment, the district court reviewed the
expert testimony presented pertaining to the benefits of single-sex education
1. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 745 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
2. VMI I comprises the cases encapsulated in the citation United States v. Virginia,
766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
3. VMI II comprises the cases encapsulated in the citation United States v. Virginia,
852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
281 (1995).
4. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). For a more extensive discussion
of the district and appeals courts opinions at the liability stage, see generally Jon A.
Soderberg, The Virginia Military Institute and the Equal Protection Clause: A Legal and
Factual Introduction, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 15 (1993).
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and found that "[v]iewed in the light of this very substantial authority favor-
ing single-sex education, the VMI board's decision to maintain an all-male
institution is fully justified even without taking into consideration the other
unique features of VMI's method of teaching and training."5
The Justice Department appealed the district court's judgment, and
subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case. 6 The appeals court held that, although the Common-
wealth had adequately demonstrated the benefits of single-sex education in
its public military institution component, it had failed to explain why the
benefits were only available to men. Thus, the court reasoned that VMI
failed to show that its "all-male" admissions policy was "substantially
related" to obtaining the benefits of "single-sex" education.7 The court
stated that "[ilt is not the maleness, as distinguished from the femaleness,
that provides justification for the program. It is the homogeneity of gender
in the process, regardless of which sex is considered, that has been shown
to be related to the essence of the education and training at VMI."' In
remanding the case to the district court, the appeals court directed the Com-
monwealth to adopt a remedy to address the constitutional violation. The
appeals court instructed:
[W]e do not mean to suggest the specific remedial course that the Com-
monwealth should or must follow hereafter. Rather, we remand the case
to the district court to give the Commonwealth the responsibility to select
a course it chooses, so long as the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are satisfied. Consistent therewith, the Commonwealth might
properly decide to admit women to VMI and to adjust the program to
implement that choice, or it might establish parallel programs, or it might
abandon state support of VMI leaving VMI the option to pursue its own
policies as a private institution. While it is not ours to determine, there
might be more creative options or determinations.9
5. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412.
6. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2431 (1993).
7. Id. at 898-900.
8. Id. at 897.
9. Id. at 900. The Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en bane was denied.
United States v. Virginia, No. 91-1690, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30490, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov.
19, 1992). The Commonwealth then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, which the Court denied. Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2431, 2431 (1993). Justice Scalia wrote a brief opinion respecting the denial of the petition
for writ of certiorari wherein he stated:
Whether it is constitutional for a State to have a men-only military school is an
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Subsequently, at the remedy stage of the litigation, the Commonwealth
established a publicly funded, all-female military program within Mary
Baldwin College, a private all-female college. Because the Commonwealth
now provided single-sex military education to both male and female students,
the district court and the Fourth Circuit upheld Virginia's single-sex admis-
sions policy under the Equal Protection Clause.
Two important issues emerge from the VMI litigation. The first issue
pertains to how the United States Supreme Court will tinker with the impre-
cise and troublesome "intermediate scrutiny" standard developed to assay
cases of gender discrimination falling under the Equal Protection Clause.
The second issue relates to the fate of the nation's private, single-sex institu-
tions should the Court rule VMI's all-male admissions policy unconstitu-
tional.
This Article begins with a framework for a discussion of these two
issues by explaining the legal and factual background of the litigation over
VMI's admissions policy. This Article then explores two permutations of
the intermediate scrutiny test, one that could be used to strike down VMI's
admissions policy and another that could be used to affirm the Common-
wealth's higher education system as presently constituted. This Article
assesses the intrinsic constitutional validity of each test. Then, assuming
arguendo that the Court strikes down VMI's all-male admissions policy, this
Article discusses the implications of such a ruling for the nation's private,
single-sex colleges. This discussion will not focus on the Supreme Court's
troubling state action doctrine; rather, it will examine the factual and practi-
cal similarities between VMI and private, single-sex institutions.
II. Equal Protection Jurisprudence
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
provides simply: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.""0 When the states ratified the Equal
Protection Clause in 1868, numerous state and federally supported, single-
sex institutions existed. These institutions continued to exist without legal
challenge for over a century. This is because the Equal Protection Clause
was intended to protect blacks in the reconstructed South from the depriva-
issue that should receive the attention of this Court before, rather than after, a
national institution as venerable as the Virginia Military Institute is compelled to
transform itself. This present petition, however, seeks our intervention before the
litigation below has come to final judgment.
Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tion of their civil rights. Thus, there is no plausible argument that the Equal
Protection Clause was intended by its drafters or those who ratified it as a
means of eliminating state-sponsored, single-sex education for either male
or female students.
It was the ratification of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by the
duly elected representatives of the people that forged the Equal Protection
Clause into the fundamental law of the United States. Without this ratifica-
tion, or as Thomas Jefferson called it "the Consent of the Governed," '" the
Equal Protection Clause would be merely a philosophical and political argu-
ment, not the "supreme Law of the Land." '12 This crucial "Consent of the
Governed," or the sanction of the electorate, should serve as the talisman of
the intrinsic validity of the Constitution because this sanction serves best to
preserve the liberty of the individual by limiting the unaccountable action of
government.
Given that the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated into the Con-
stitution to protect the newly emancipated blacks, the question arises, "How
did VMI's valid pre- and post-Fourteenth Amendment admissions policy end
up in the courts?" Clearly, there has been no ratification of an amendment
to the Constitution that would evidence an expansion of the national elector-
ate's ratifying consent to proscribe single-sex education. Further, there has
been no vote by the Commonwealth's duly elected representatives to pro-
scribe VMI's all-male admissions policy. In fact, as the district court
observed in VMIH, the Commonwealth's elected representatives wholeheart-
edly support the continuance of VMI as an all-male institution.' 3
Moreover, the continued existence of many private single-sex educa-
tional institutions demonstrates clearly that the factual benefit of single-sex
education, implicitly recognized by the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause, is still vibrantly alive today. Stated differently, when the Supreme
Court struck down the separate but equal doctrine in the context of racial
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (U.S. 1776).
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
13. To highlight the Commonwealth's support of VM's all-male admissions policy, the
district court referenced affidavits filed by Governor George F. Allen, former Governor L.
Douglas Wilder, Lieutenant Governor Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Attorney General James S.
Gilmore, I]I, as well as other Commonwealth officials endorsing the Commonwealth's system
of higher education as currently constituted. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471,
483-84 (W.D. Va. 1994), aft'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281
(1995). Thus, the district court found that "[i]n short, every person in Virginia officialdom
who has or ever has had the authority to affect Virginia's policies on higher education has
spoken in favor of diversity by offering single-sex education to men and women of the
Commonwealth and have [sic] strongly supported VWIL." Id. at 484.
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segregation, the Court based its decision on a factual paradigm in which the
white majority imposed an inferior educational system on a politically
powerless minority. 4 In stark contrast, the continued popularity and striking
success of all-female institutions such as private, all-female Wellesley
College and public, all-female Douglas College and of all-male institutions
such as VMI and the Citadel demonstrate continued private and electoral
support for an educational system enjoyed by both women and men. Fur-
thermore, given that women constitute over 50% of the enfranchised popula-
tion, they ipso facto cannot be considered a political minority as are blacks
in the racial paradigm.
Instead of allowing the sanction of the national electorate to amend the
Equal Protection Clause or allowing duly elected legislative bodies to decide
the policy issue of whether to support all-male and all-female educational
institutions with tax dollars, the Supreme Court has taken it upon itself to
engraft the expansive concepts of the failed Equal Rights Amendment into
the "supreme Law of the Land." Although such judicial action abandons
"Consent of the Governed" as the ultimate legitimizing source of law and
thus circumscribes the liberty of the governed, it is nonetheless binding
under the Supremacy Clause. How did this wholesale and unratified change
in the Constitution take place? One step at a time.
From the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868 until 1971, the
Supreme Court never held that the Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
mandated certain treatment of men or women by state governments. In
1971, however, the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed, 5 wherein it struck
down an Idaho statute that provided for the selection of an administrator for
an estate whereby males would be chosen over females without regard to
individual qualifications as testator.16 In Reed, the Court applied a standard
of review stricter than the rational basis test but less strict than the virtually
insurmountable strict scrutiny test.'7 The rationale behind this flexible
standard is that the Constitution tolerates some laws that discriminate be-
tween the two sexes because genuine psychological and physiological differ-
ences exist between gender groups. Unlike laws that discriminate on the
basis of race - which are usually born of invidious stereotyping and racial
animus - laws that discriminate on the basis of gender may result from
fundamental psychological and physiological differences between males and
females. Thus, the problem posed to legislatures and courts is to determine
14. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
16. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971).
17. Id.
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correctly whether these fundamental differences are substantial enough in a
given context to justify discriminatory treatment under the law.
In Craig v. Boren, 8 the Supreme Court rearticulated the intermediate
scrutiny test appropriate for the examination of sex-based classifications,
stating that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish
that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 19
Thus, a sex-based admissions policy may be upheld in the face of constitu-
tional challenge "only by showing at least that the classification serves
'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'"
The state's proffered interest must be examined carefully to determine
whether it "reflects archaic and stereotypical notions" of the sexes and will
be found illegitimate if its purpose is to "exclude or 'protect' members of
one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap
or to be innately inferior."21 Moreover, even if the asserted interest is
legitimate and important, the state must still show a "direct, substantial
relationship between objective and means. "I The state meets its burden only
by showing, at a minimum, that the discrimination serves important govern-
mental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives. 3
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based clas-
sification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concern-
ing the roles and abilities of males and females.' Care must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereo-
typical notions.' Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or to "pro-
tect" members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegiti-
mate.' The issue is not whether the benefitted class profits from the classifi-
cation, but whether the state's decision to confer a benefit only upon one
18. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
19. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
20. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
21. Id. at 725.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 730.
24. Id. at 724-25.
25. Id. at 725.
26. Id.
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class by means of a discriminatory classification is substantially related to
achieving a legitimate and substantial goal.
In Brown v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court overturned the
race-based doctrine of "separate but equal," declaring that "education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. "29 The
Brown Court noted that the quality of education is determined by more than
equality among tangible factors.' Thus, the Brown Court reasoned that
separate but equal educational facilities for students based upon race was
antithetical to the Constitution because of the psychological harm inflicted
upon children denied the right to attend school with other children solely on
the basis of race.3
Although the Brown Court's sweeping pronouncement that "in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place"'32
suggests a categorical ban on the use of separate but equal educational
facilities, courts subsequent to Brown have recognized exceptions to Brown's
apparent ban on separate but equal in the context of education when the
classifications are based upon gender rather than upon race. In Vorchheimer
v. School District,33 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered a policy of the City of Philadelphia that maintained a
school system involving four types of high schools with different admissions
requirements.' These schools were denominated as academic, technical,
magnet, and comprehensive high schools that were generally open to both
sexes.35 The school system included two single-sex academic high schools
that offered only college preparatory classes.36 Approximately 7% of the
27. Id. at731 n.17.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. Brown v.-Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 493-95. The Court stated:
Mhe policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferior-
ity of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of
... the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.
Id. at 494 (second alteration in original) (quoting from lower court's findings in Kansas case).
32. Id. at 495.
33. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
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school-age population was eligible to attend the academic schools.37 The
plaintiff was a gifted teenage girl who graduated from her junior high school
class with honors and who would have been eligible to attend Central High
School, the boys' academic high school, but for her gender." Both Central
High School and Girls High School, its female equivalent, were "comparable
in quality, academic standing, and prestige. ,39 The Third Circuit held that,
although the plaintiff had a valid interest in an expanded freedom to choose
the high school that she would attend, the expansion of her choice was
outweighed by the harm that providing her an expanded choice would cause.
The court stated:
[A]II public single-sex schools would have to be abolished. The absence
of these schools would stifle the ability of the local school board to
continue with a respected educational methodology. It follows too that
those students and parents who prefer an education in a public, single-
sex school would be denied their freedom of choice. The existence of
private schools is no more an answer to those people than it is to the
plaintiff.40
Thus, the Third Circuit implicitly endorsed the concept of separate but equal
for gender classifications in education because such classifications enhanced
educational opportunities available to the benefitted class that may not have
been available otherwise.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision in the
Vorchheimer case, it did not address squarely the constitutionality of single-
sex, public education until 1982, when it decided Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan. In Hogan, the Supreme Court addressed whether
Mississippi's justification for the policy of allowing men to audit nursing
courses but of not granting men academic credit for courses at Mississippi
University for Women (MUW), a state-supported institution, violated the
equal protection rights of males wishing to receive academic credit for
courses at MUW.42 Mr. Hogan was a registered nurse and a Mississippi
resident who applied for admission to the school of nursing, which offered
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 882.
40. Id. at 888; see also Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D.S.C. 1970)
(holding that all-female, public liberal arts college can constitutionally deny male applicants
admission to school solely on basis of sex when male plaintiffs had complete range of other
state institutions to attend), aft'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
41. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
42. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719 (1982).
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baccalaureate and graduate programs in nursing.43 Hogan met the qualifica-
tions for admission to the nursing program on all counts except one: He was
a male, and the school restricted admission to females only.' Thus, Hogan
was denied admission to the school of nursing solely because of his gender.4"
Mississippi statutes, which included the charter of the university, restricted
the enrollment at MUW to women.' The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
vote, invalidated the exclusion of males from the state nursing school.47
The Hogan Court left unanswered the question of whether MUW could
deny men admission to other schools within the university: "[W]e decline to
address the question of whether MUW's admissions policy, as applied to
males seeking admission to schools other than the school of nursing, violates
the Fourteenth Amendment. "I Thus, the Hogan majority declined to adopt
a categorical approach against the dispensation of educational benefits by
gender.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Hogan was written within the
framework of the Court's post-Craig, mid-level scrutiny analysis. Thus, the
school's policy would be upheld only if it served important governmental
objectives and only if the discriminatory admissions policy was substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives. Mississippi justified the
school's single-sex admissions policy on the grounds that it compensated for
past discrimination against women.49 Justice O'Connor found this proffered
justification unpersuasive because of the fact that women were not under-
represented in the field of nursing.' According to Justice O'Connor, the
school's single-sex admissions policy "perpetuate[s] the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively woman's job" instead of compensating for discrim-
inatory barriers faced by women."
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, Powell and Chief Justice Burger dis-
sented. The dissenters, with varying degrees of conviction, suggested that
equal protection principles tolerate states providing separate but equal educa-
tional benefits and opportunities based upon gender. Chief Justice Burger
dissented to emphasize that the Court's holding was very narrow and was
43. Id. at 720.
44. Id. at 720-21.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 720 & n. 1.
47. Id. at 733.
48. Id. at 723 n.7.
49. Id. at 727.
50. Id. at 727, 729.
51. Id. at 729.
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limited to the context of a professional nursing school.' Justice Blackmun
dissented, musing that "I hope that we do not lose all values that some think
are worthwhile... and relegate ourselves to needless conformity.""3 Justice
Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, offered the most compelling dissent.
Justice Powell determined that "[t]his is simply not a sex discrimination
case" and that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause was never intended to be
applied to this kind of case."'  Justice Powell argued that the majority's
opinion invariably would prohibit states from providing single-sex schools.5'
According to Justice Powell, as long as Hogan was provided some oppor-
tunity to receive a similar educational benefit, although at a different location
and in a slightly different form, he was treated substantially equally. 6 Thus,
Justice Powell found no justification for judicial intervention because Hogan
could have received a similar education at another school.
What is apparent from this evolution from posited political theory to
unratified constitutional law is that the Supreme Court now requires a fact-
specific inquiry into the legitimacy of an all-male admissions policy at the
Virginia Military Institute. This inquiry requires not an examination of
single-sex education in the abstract but a fact-specific inquiry into the Com-
monwealth's system of higher education that provides, through VMI, a
unique educational opportunity to men but not to women. The dispositive
inquiry, therefore, is whether the differences between men and women
permit the Commonwealth to favor men over women in admission to VMIY.
Under the intermediate scrutiny test as it is presently applied, in order for
the Commonwealth to provide a VMI education for its male citizens only,
it must demonstrate some legitimate difference between men and women to
justify granting men, and not women, this special opportunity. This is why
the Fourth Circuit ruled against the Commonwealth in VMII, and this is why
the same result should obtain in the Supreme Court unless the Court adjusts
its equal protection analysis to accommodate publicly funded, single-sex
schools.
58
52. Id. at 733 (Burger, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 741-42 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. Allan Ides, The Curious Case of the Virginia Military Institute: An Essay of the
Judicial Function, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 38 (1993).
58. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text (discussing current equal protection
analysis and its deficiencies in the context of gender distinctions).
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 429 (1996)
1X. Single-Sex Education
At the core of the VMI litigation is the important question of whether
single-sex educational institutions can receive public financial support even
when such institutions necessarily exclude students on the basis of gender.
The evidence presented in the VMI litigation shows unambiguously that
single-sex education is an effective and, in many cases, preferable method
for educating some students.59 The factual findings of the district court,
affirmed by the court of appeals, show that all-female institutions are partic-
ularly successful at advancing women into traditionally male-dominated
fields such as science, politics, and business.' For example, 42% of the
female members of Congress attended private women's colleges, as did one-
third of the women on the boards of Fortune 1000 companies. In VMI I,
the Fourth Circuit noted that both males and females were more likely to
pursue nontraditional, nonstereotypical careers if they attended single-sex
schools.' Thus, single-sex education advances, rather than inhibits, the
expanding role of women and men in our society.
The evidence concerning single-sex education demonstrates that single-
sex education is a desirable and legitimate method of educating certain
students. If one accepts the premise that government should strive to pro-
vide the best educational opportunities possible, then the government has a
legitimate interest in funding single-sex educational opportunities. The
legislative branch, where such policy decisions were made prior to the
Supreme Court's expansion of equal protection jurisprudence, has recog-
nized the value of single-sex institutions in enacting Title IX.63 The over-
arching question posed in the VMI litigation, however, is whether the
judicial gloss applied to the Equal Protection Clause permits the government
to continue providing the same desirable and beneficial opportunities it did
when the Equal Protection Clause was ratified. Accordingly, under the
59. For a thorough discussion of the benefits of single-sex education, see Kristin S.
Caplice, The Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227,
241-51 (1994). See also United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1406, 1412 (W.D. Va.
1991) (discussing empirical studies on educational experiences in single-sex colleges),
vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
60. See Sharon K. Mollman, The Gender Gap: Separating the Sexes in Public Educa-
tion, 68 IND. L.J. 149, 171 (1992).
61. Edward B. Fiske, Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1989, at B8.
62. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Marvin Bressler
& Peter Wendell, The Sex Composition of Selective Colleges and Gender Differences in Career
Aspirations, 51 J. HIGHEREDUC. 650, 652 (1980)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
63. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing rationale behind exemptions
for single-sex schools in Title IX).
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Court's existing equal protection doctrine, it is necessary to evaluate the
differences between VMI and the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL) to determine whether there is a sufficient fit between the Common-
wealth's asserted goal in preserving diversity in higher education and the
means used to attain this goal.
IV. Comparison of VMI and VWIL
In VMI II, the Commonwealth proposed the reservation of VMI exclu-
sively for men and the creation of VWIL for women. As implemented,
VWIL is a separate program located on the campus of a private women's
liberal arts college. Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
resolve the VMI case based upon the differences between the VWIL program
and VMI, the Court could issue a narrow opinion finding the proposed
remedy, the VWIL program, insufficiently comparable to VMI because of
its design. The significance of such a holding would lie in the tacit recogni-
tion that a more carefully tailored all-female program could justify VMI's
all-male admissions policy. This would have to be the result of a new equal
protection analysis, one that focused on the Commonwealth's system of
higher education as a whole and not just on VMI's all-male status. A
comparison of the VMI and VWIL programs is therefore appropriate. The
following provides an overview of the different features of the VMI and
VWIL programs that could be significant should the Supreme Court decide
to issue a narrow holding striking down the Commonwealth's proposed
remedy on the grounds that the Commonwealth, through the VWIL pro-
gram, does not provide a sufficiently comparable single-sex experience for
women as it does for men through VMI. For the reasons given below,
however, it is unlikely that the Court will decide the case on these grounds.
A. VMI
VMI, founded in 1839, is a small, public four-year college with an
enrollment of about 1300 men.6 It offers majors in the liberal arts, sci-
ences, and engineering. All of its academic offerings are also available at
other public colleges and universities in Virginia. 5 VMI's mission is "to
produce educated and honorable men who are suited for leadership in civil-
ian life and who can provide military leadership when necessary."'  VMI
64. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
281 (1995).
65. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1424 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
66. Id. at 1425.
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employs an "adversative" method of education which is designed to develop
character and leadership in young men. That method is intended to cause
students to question their past convictions, values, and experiences and
thereby to prepare them to accept the values and behaviors VMI teaches.'
Physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of
privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values
are the salient nonacademic attributes of the VMI educational experience.6
First-year VMI students are subjected to an extreme form of the adversative
model that captures the physical rigor and mental stress of the Marine Corps
boot camp.6
VIAL uses a "class system" that assigns specific privileges and responsi-
bilities to each class of cadets in order to develop character and leadership.
Thus, the first class, or seniors, are responsible for providing overall leader-
ship, writing the standard operating procedures for aspects of the adversative
system, and serving as mentors to new cadets. "The class system is a very
highly-developed system for cultivating leadership," and it "teaches and rein-
forces through peer pressure the values and behaviors that VMI exists to
promote. "70
Cadets at VMI are bound by an honor code, which provides that a cadet
"does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do."71 The honor code
"dominates all facets of institutional life" and is enforced by an honor court
comprising cadets elected by their classmates.' VMI cadets live in a four-
story barracks housing one class per floor. "There is a total lack of privacy"
in the barracks: [Tjhere are no door locks or window shades, and the doors
to the students' rooms contain windows that permit the officer in charge to
view every cadet in their rooms.73 The barracks features group bathrooms
and "close and intimate quarters."74 In short, "there is literally no place in
the barracks that physically affords privacy," and students are thus "under
constant scrutiny. "75 This total lack of privacy and constant supervision by
the entire corps is an integral part of the VMI experience. 76
67. Id. at 1421.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1422.
70. Id. at 1423.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1424.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1423-24.
76. Id.
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Strict egalitarianism is a central and essential attribute of the VMI
method. The VMI experience is based on absolute equality, which is
achieved through treating everyone in exactly the same way,77 and the
spartan and public nature of life in the barracks is reflective of the egalitarian
ethic at VMI, as is the fact that VMI imposes the same physical requirements
on all students, regardless of ability. 8 Every effort is made to subordinate
physical or material distinctions among cadets by requiring all cadets to wear
the same uniforms, live in the same spare quarters, attain the same level of
physical fitness, and undergo the same constant scrutiny by the other cadets.
Unlike the federal military academies, which exist to prepare their
graduates for career service in the armed forces, VMI strives to prepare its
students for both military and civilian life.79 Thus, VMI's military emphasis
is regarded primarily as a teaching device. Although each VMI student must
participate in a Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program that
provides the same training for a military career as the ROTC programs
offered at other undergraduate institutions in Virginia, only 15% of VMI
graduates choose military careers.'
B. VW!L
The VWIL program was created in response to the Fourth Circuit's
ruling in VMI L VWIL, designed to reflect "the differences and the needs
of college-age men and women,"'1 is based on "a cooperative method which
reinforces self-esteem rather than the leveling process used by VMI."I The
VWIL program was specially designed to develop character and leadership
in young women.m
The Commonwealth established VWIL within Mary Baldwin College,
a women's liberal arts college founded in 1842 in Staunton, Virginia, about
thirty-five miles from VMI. Although Mary Baldwin College is a private
institution, the VWIL program is publicly funded. The VWIL program, as
constructed, is the by-product of a task force chaired by Dr. James D. Lott,
77. Brief for the Cross-Petitioners at 12, United States v. Virginia, No. 94-1941 (S. Ct.




81. Brief for the Petitioner at 8, United States v. Virginia, No. 94-1941 (S. Ct. brief
filed Nov. 16, 1995).
82. Id.
83. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1233-35 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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dean of Mary Baldwin College. The task force's stated goal was to design
a program at Mary Baldwin College to produce citizen-soldiers who are
educated and honorable women, prepared for varied work of civil life,
qualified to serve in the armed forces, imbued with love of learning, confi-
dent in the functions and attitudes of leadership, and possessing a high sense
of public service.
Because VWIL's mission was modeled after VMI's mission, VWIL
students pursue the same five goals as those pursued at VMI: education,
military training, mental and physical discipline, character development, and
leadership development. In developing the VWIL program at Mary Baldwin
College, however, the task force eschewed aspects of VMI's military model,
especially the adversative method, because it concluded that certain of VMI's
methods would not be effective for women as a group, even though the task
force concluded that some women would be suited to and interested in an all-
female VMI-type experience. The task force determined that VWIL's
mission and goals could better be achieved by designing a program that de-
emphasized the military methods associated with the rat line, using instead
a structured enviromnent emphasizing leadership training.
In addition to the standard bachelor of arts program offered at Mary
Baldwin College, the VWIL program requires its students to complete, as a
"minor," core and elective courses in leadership. Students in the VWIL
program must take courses in leadership communications; theories of leader-
ship; ethics, community, and leadership; and a leadership seminar or semes-
ter of independent research on a topic relevant to women and leadership.
VWIL students are also required to participate in Saturday seminars spon-
sored by upperclass students on designated subjects. In addition to the
VWIL program's classroom component, VWIL students are obligated to
complete a leadership externship during which they work off-campus in the
public or private sector for up to one semester. VWIL students are also
required to participate in a speaker series in which each VWIL class is
responsible for bringing outstanding leaders to speak on campus. In addi-
tion, all VWIL students are required to organize and participate in commu-
nity service projects.
Students at VWIL must participate in four years of ROTC and in a
ROTC summer camp. The VWIL program is not organized under the
pervasive military regimen that exists at VMI; however, in addition to
standard ROTC training, VWIL students are required to conduct "leadership
laboratory activities" that might incorporate aspects of military training, and
they participate in a newly established Virginia Corps of Cadets, a largely
ceremonial uniformed military corps comprising the all-female VWIL, the
all-male VMI, and the coeducational Virginia Tech ROTC corps.
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Finally, VWIL students are required to complete successfully eight
semesters of physical education, a portion of which is devoted to health
education courses. These programs include athletics, which comprise
physical training in a "cooperative confidence building" program held twice
a week.
The VWIL program is implemented with Mary Baldwin College fac-
ulty, although VMI faculty conduct some ROTC training and teach some
ROTC courses at VWIL. The Commonwealth funds the program, providing
a per student payment equal to the current annual appropriation paid per
cadet at VMI. The task force expected the VWIL program to have approxi-
mately twenty-five to thirty students in the first year and also to receive a
permanent endowment of $5.45 million. The out-of-pocket expenses for
students who attend VWIL is expected to be no greater than those of students
attending VMI, and VWIL students should be eligible for the same financial
aid programs as are available to VMI cadets.
V. VMI II
A. The District Court's Opinion
On remand, the district court conducted a six-day trial on the Common-
wealth's proposed remedy, the VWIL program, which was offered as a
single-sex alternative for women. In late April 1994, the district court
issued an opinion finding that the Commonwealth's system of higher educa-
tion with the new VWIL component passed constitutional muster.
The district court observed that the United States and the Common-
wealth were bound up in a fundamental disagreement over the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause. The United States argued that the Constitution
and the remand instructions from the Fourth Circuit demanded that if the
Commonwealth attempted to establish a separate program for young women,
it must be in all respects a facsimile of the VMI program.' The Common-
wealth maintained that the mandate of the Fourth Circuit, as well as the
demands of the Equal Protection Clause, required Virginia only to provide
a state-supported, all-female college program that would achieve an outcome
for women that is comparable to that received by young men upon gradua-
tion from VMIY
The district court noted that the United States' reading of the Fourth
Circuit's remand instructions required the creation of a "mirror image" or
84. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd, 44 F.3d
1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
85. Id.
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a separate but equal institution.86 The district court observed, however, that
the separate but equal concept was debunked in Sweatt v. Painter"' and that
the appeals court did not contemplate such a remedy."8 The district court
further found that if separate but equal is a standard by which the Common-
wealth's plan is to be assayed, then it must fail because, even if the VWIL
program were equal on an objective level to VMI, the VWIL program
"cannot supply the intangible qualities of history, reputation, tradition, and
prestige that VMI has amassed over the years."89
In ruling that the Commonwealth's proposed remedy passed constitu-
tional muster, the district court concluded that equal protection did not
require the Commonwealth to admit women to VMI but rather to provide a
state-supported, all-female college program that would attain an outcome for
women comparable to that received by young men upon graduation from
VMI and that the Commonwealth's plan to offer comparable-outcome
education through the new all-female institution on the campus of Mary
Baldwin College satisfied constitutional standards.' °
86. Id. at 475. The district court remarked that the United States finds support for this
position in the Fourth Circuit statement "whether the unique benefit offered by VIn's type
of education can be denied to women by the state under a policy of diversity . .. ." Id.
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 898 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2431 (1993)).
87. 399 U.S. 629 (1950). In Sweatt, the Supreme Court struck down the University
of Texas Law School's admissions policy, which categorically denied admission to blacks.
Although Texas offered a newly established all-Negro law school that it claimed remedied
any constitutional violation occurring by virtue of the University of Texas Law School's
admissions policy, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the tangible qualities that made the
University of Texas Law School superior to the proposed new law school for Negroes,
noted:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses, to a
far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement
but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a
few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration,
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige.
Sweatt v. Painter, 399 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
88. The district court reasoned that the Fourth Circuit, in light of the Sweatt decision,
would not have assigned the Commonwealth the impossible task of establishing a "separate
but equal" VMI. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 475.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 473. The district court noted at the outset that the Commonwealth's proposed
plan differs substantially from the VMI program and thus, if the United States' position
regarding the Fourth Circuit's mandate on remand and the dictates of the Equal Protection
Clause are correct, then the Commonwealth's plan fails to pass constitutional muster. Id.
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B. The Fourth Circuit's Opinion
The U.S. Department of Justice appealed the district court's ruling on
the Commonwealth's proposed remedy to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. In United States v. Virginia," the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's opinion and remanded the case to the lower court for
implementation of the Commonwealth's proposed remedy. The Fourth
Circuit considered whether the Commonwealth's proposal (1) to continue to
provide a single-gender, military-type college education for men at VMI;
(2) to provide, beginning in 1995, a single-gender education with special
leadership training for women at Mary Baldwin College; and (3) to continue
to provide other forms of college education, including military training, for
both men and women at other colleges and universities in the state is consti-
tutionally permissible. 2
1. The Majority Opinion
The Fourth Circuit found that application of the standard intermediate
scrutiny test to the case at bar, in which the classification is not directed per
se at men or women but at homogeneity of gender, presents a unique prob-
lem because once the state's objective is found to be important, classification
by gender is - by definition - necessary for accomplishing the objective.93
The court, therefore, found that the second prong of the intermediate scru-
tiny test would "provide little or no scrutiny of the effect of the classification
directed at homogeneity of gender."' Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined
that in order to evaluate the legitimacy of a classification based upon the
homogeneity of gender against the Equal Protection Clause, it is necessary
to resort to an additional measure that carefully weighs the alternatives
available to members of each gender denied benefits by the classification.95
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, created a third step in the intermediate scru-
tiny inquiry, which it deemed the "substantive comparability" prong.96
91. 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.).
92. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
281 (1995).
93. Id. at 1237.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Fourth Circuit focused on the substantive comparability of the mutually
exclusive programs provided to men and women in order to resolve the equal protection
issue, framing the issues presented on appeal as follows:
[I]n this case, we will examine a state-sponsored educational scheme offered by
the Commonwealth of Virginia, under which the state provides a single-gender
military-type college education to men and single-gender college education with
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With regard to the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test, the Fourth
Circuit found that single-gender education constitutes a legitimate and
important governmental objective.' The Fourth Circuit stated that providing
the option of a single-gender college education may be considered a legiti-
mate and important aspect of a public system of higher education98 and that
single-gender education at the college level is beneficial to both sexes. 9
The court next considered whether the classifications existing in the
Commonwealth's system of higher education are substantially related to the
state's purpose. 3° The court noted, "When combined with a third part of the
test, i.e., the inquiry into whether excluded men and women have opportuni-
ties to obtain substantively comparable benefits, this inquiry scrutinizes the
means by which the state chooses to obtain its objective." 10'
The court found that the importance of classifying students by gender
in higher education flows from having a student body of the same sex rather
than from having a student body that is male or female.10 The only way to
realize the benefits of homogeneity of gender is to limit admission to one
sex. 103 The court, therefore, further found that the classification for single-
gender education at VMI is directly related to achieving the results of an
adversative method in a military environment.1"
special leadership training to women, and determine (1) whether the state's
objective of providing single-gender education to its citizens may be considered a
legitimate and important governmental objective; (2) whether the gender classifica-
tion adopted is directly and substantially related to that purpose; and (3) whether
the resulting mutual exclusion of women and men from each other's institution
leaves open opportunities for those excluded to obtain substantively comparable
benefits at their institutions or through other means offered by the state.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1238.
99. Id. The court noted that a brief submitted to the court by the parties and amici
curiae included a multitude of professional articles describing the benefits of single-gender
education, especially for late adolescents coming out of high school. Id. Given the growing
consensus in the professional community that a sexually homogeneous environment yields
concrete educational benefits, the court was willing to defer to the Commonwealth's selection
of educational techniques when the purpose of providing single-gender education was not
pernicious and fell within the range of the traditional governmental objective of providing





104. Id. The adversative method, according to the Court of Appeals, is predicated on
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The necessity of a gender-discriminatory classification to achieve
homogeneity of gender notwithstanding, the court reasoned that in order for
such exclusions to pass constitutional muster, the excluded men and the
excluded women must have reasonable opportunities to obtain benefits
substantively comparable to those they are denied. 5 The court, therefore,
reasoned that the equal protection violation could be remedied by providing
comparable benefits to both sexes based on substance but not on form and
detail.'
The court then looked to whether VMI and the VWIL program at Mary
Baldwin College offered the same substantive benefits to both genders. The
court touched upon the salient similarities between the two programs, such
as the provision of a single-gender environment, the offering of a bachelor's
degree, and the presence of a program designed to produce discipline and
honor among students who are well suited for leadership. 1' The court
further pointed out that the missions and goals of both programs are similar
and that, although the mechanisms for achieving the goals differ between the
two programs, the differences are attributable to demonstrated pedagogical
differences between the sexes as reflected in the record.108
In the final analysis, the appeals court found that, given that the mission
and goals are the same for both VMI and the VWIL program and notwith-
standing the difference in methodologies for attaining the goals, the institu-
tions' differences and methodologies are constitutionally acceptable because
they are both reasonably calculated to succeed at each institution.'0 9 The
a sexually homogenous environment which allows for aggressiveness, conflict, egalitarianism,
lack of privacy, and both physical and mental stress. Id.
105. Id. at 1239-40.
106. The court rejected the United States' interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
finding that equal protection does not require identical programs for men and women. Id. at
1240. The court stated that "the alternative of allowing a state to provide benefits only when
they could be provided in identical form to all of its citizens, regardless of whether they are
similarly circumstanced is justified only by a needless, and indeed baseless, demand for
conformity." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1240-41. The court reflected on the differences in opinions among education
experts as to whether the adversative and pervasive military method applied to men at VMI
should be applied to women at VWIL. Id. at 1241. The court accepted as accurate and
persuasive the testimony of educational experts for the Commonwealth that women may not
respond similarly to the adversative method as men respond at VMI and that a women's VMI-
type program would thus not be best suited to attaining the similar goals and objectives as are
obtained at VMI. Id.
109. Id. With regard to the intangible qualities of VMI that are necessarily unavailable
at VWIL, such as the deep history and prestige behind a degree from VMI, the court noted
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 429 (1996)
court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court, but remanded the
case with instructions that the district court conduct "a specific review to
ensure that (1) the program is headed by a well-qualified, motivated adminis-
trator, attracted by a level of compensation suited for the position; (2) the
program is well-promoted to potentially qualified candidates; (3) the pro-
gram includes a commitment for adequate state funding for the near term;
and (4) the program includes a mechanism for continuing review by qualified
professional educators so that its elements may be adjusted as necessary to
keep the program aimed not only at providing a quality bachelor's degree,
but also at affording the additional element of taught discipline and leader-
ship training for women." 1 0
2. Judge PhiIllips's Dissent
Judge Phillips, a Senior Fourth Circuit Judge from North Carolina,
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he expressed skepticism with regard to
the state's proposed remedy."' Judge Phillips argued that the only constitu-
tional remedy to VMI's male-only admissions policy is either ordering
coeducation at VMI or forgoing further state support for VII. 1 Acknowl-
that such benefits must be the "by-product of a longer-term effort." Id. The court found
that the equal protection violation found in VM! I was remedied because the programs
offered at both institutions can be substantively comparable if VWIL is "undertaken with
a persistently high level of commitment by Virginia and that men and women mutually
excluded by the two programs will not be denied the opportunity for an undergraduate
education with discipline and special training and leadership." Id. The court further
observed that Virginia offers a diverse menu of opportunities in higher education through
additional state-supported colleges and universities, including the coed ROTC program at
Virginia Tech. Id.
110. Id. at 1242.
111. Expressing his skepticism, Judge Phillips remarked, "I do not believe the pro-
posed remedial plan, whose judicial adoption in unrealized form obviously does not bring
Virginia into present compliance with equal protection guarantees, has any real and
effectively measurable capacity to do so over foreseeable time." Id. at 1243 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips further observed that when VMI was
founded in 1839 as a state-supported military school for men only, there could be no question
that the founders did not consider the possibility that women should be considered for
admission to the institution. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). He also pointed out that no
conscious governmental choice between alternatives in higher education drove the original
decision leading to VMI's male-only admissions policy and that VMI's all-male admissions
policy reflected historical stereotypical notions of the different rules in society of men and
women. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips further observed that until the Justice
Department brought suit against the Commonwealth in 1981, Virginia had not undertaken any
re-examination of VMI's original all-male admissions policy. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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edging the novelty of the legal issue raised by the VI case, Judge Phillips
queried whether separate, state-supported educational institutions for men
and women, like those for white and black students, are so "inherently
unequal" by reason of their stigmatic implications that gender classification
violates equal protection per se and warrants no further scrutiny - that is,
whether such classifications should be subject to the same strict scrutiny as
race-based classifications."'
Judge Phillips agreed with the majority's characterization of the basic
structures of both the VWIL and VMI programs, but found "real
problem[s]" in the Commonwealth's identification of its important interest
used to justify its classifications. 4 Judge Phillips identified three separate
objectives asserted by the Commonwealth: (1) providing separate single-
gender education facilities for both men and women because of the intrinsic
value to some members of both genders of such a social environment for
education ("intrinsic value"); (2) producing both men and women particu-
larly suited for leadership roles as "citizen soldiers" by providing separate,
single-gender educational programs for each that are designed to accommo-
date the different psychological and emotional strengths and weaknesses in
becoming effective leaders in either domain ("gender-adapted leadership
training"); and (3) providing separate, single-gender educational facilities for
men and women as part of an overall objective of providing a diverse array
of state-supported, higher-education opportunities ("system-diversity"). 5
Judge Phillips then examined the genuineness of the proposed governmental
objectives asserted by the Commonwealth, and he concluded that the legiti-
macy of the asserted governmental objectives suggested by the Common-
wealth failed the Hogan standard." 6 He instead determined that the asserted
governmental interests "are rationalizations compelled by the exigencies of
113. Id. at 1244 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips noted that "[e]ach of these
inescapable problems raises for us issues of first impression and application of equal protec-
tion jurisprudence to the resolution of this case." Id. at 1245 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge
Phillips found it unnecessary to address that question because, in his opinion, the proposed
VWIL plan clearly fails to pass equal protection muster. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge
Phillips remarked at the outset that "[because I believe that even were the VWIL proposal
to be substantially consummated in foreseeable time the resulting two-component arrangement
would not pass equal protection muster, I would proceed on that assumption .. " Id.
(Phillips, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1246 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
116. Judge Phillips reasoned that "[tihis was exactly what the Supreme Court did in
rejecting the State of Mississippi's assertion in Hogan that its primary objectives in maintain-
ing its School of Nursing for women only was to compensate for past discrimination against
them." Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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this litigation rather than an actual overriding purpose of the proposed
separate-but-equal arrangement. "117
Judge Phillips's skepticism over the Commonwealth's proposed reme-
dial plan was expressed with full force in his discussion of the genuineness
of the Commonwealth's asserted important interest used to justify the gender
classification.' Judge Phillips observed that the Commonwealth did not
actively defend VMI's men-only policy in VMI L.9 Given that the current
classification is merely a means by which the Commonwealth can achieve
the end of maintaining VMI's original 1839 policy of excluding women,
according to Judge Phillips, the Commonwealth's proposed remedy should
be struck down for this reason alone,2
Accepting arguendo the importance of the governmental objectives
asserted by the Commonwealth, Judge Phillips turned to the second prong
of the intermediate scrutiny equal protection test - whether the Common-
wealth has made an "exceedingly persuasive" demonstration that the classifi-
cation embodied in its VMI and VWIL programs is "substantially and
directly related to its proposed remedial objectives."'' Noting that the
117. Id. at 1247 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips opined, "I think [the record] would
support a confident and fair conclusion that the primary, overriding purpose [of the gender
classifications] is not to create a new type of educational opportunity for women, nor to
broaden the Commonwealth's educational base for producing a special kind of citizen-soldier
leadership, nor to further diversify the Commonwealth's higher education system - though
all of these might result serendipitously from the arrangement - but is simply by this means
to allow VMI to continue to exclude women in order to preserve its historic character and
mission as that is perceived and has been primarily defined in this litigation by VMI and
directly affiliated parties." Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1247 n.7 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In the same footnote,
Judge Phillips stated:
Making judicial notice of matters surely of common knowledge in the Common-
wealth, I would be prepared to conclude that (1) the perception underlying the
policy justification advanced by VMI officials and alumni organizations remains
alive and strongly held by those parties, and that (2) the prestige and influence of
VMI and its justly loyal alumni and their organization in influencing any political
decision affecting VMI's interest is sufficiently powerful to ensure that their
overriding purpose in this matter effectively defines the actual governmental
objective of the Commonwealth's proposed remedial plan. That overriding
purpose remains the preservation of VMI as a state-supported educational institu-
tion for men only, with all other asserted purposes of the plan merely a secondary
means to that end.
Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1248 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
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question of whether a challenged classification is substantially related to its
asserted goals is an opaque one, Judge Phillips looked back at the three
asserted governmental objectives that he identified in short form as "intrinsic
value," "gender-adapted leadership training," and "system-diversity." Judge
Phillips observed that, as a threshold matter, no separate, single-gender
school arrangement "could be found substantially related to any conceivable
governmental objective unless the benefits to be separately distributed by the
arrangement were substantially equal across the board of the relevant criteria
for evaluating educational institutions."" Given that a newly established all-
women's program could not possibly offer the same benefits that an institu-
tion established before the Civil War could offer, under Judge Phillips's
interpretation of the intermediate scrutiny standard, the inexorable conclu-
sion was that VI's historical, discriminatory admissions policy could be
remedied only through either (1) abandonment of state support for the VMI
or (2) admission of women to VMI. Judge Phillips concluded that, al-
though a state could constitutionally establish separate, single-sex institu-
tions, it could do so only if those institutions were established simultaneously
and provided substantially comparable curricular and extracurricular pro-
grams, funding, physical plant, administration and support services, and
faculty and library resources." The arrangement for constitutionally
permissible public, single-sex institutions that Judge Phillips posited in his
dissent clearly could not accommodate any remedial proposal that would
preserve the single-sex admissions policy of VMI or any other pre-existing
single-sex institution for that matter. Thus, Judge Phillips concluded that
"[n]o separate single-gender arrangement that involved VMIL as the all-men
school and any newly founded separate institution (whether free-standing or
an appendage) as the all-women's component could pass equal protection
U.S. 718, 724, 730 (1982)).
122. Id. at 1249 (Phillips, J., dissenting). To support this position, Judge Phillips looked
at the separate but equal educational arrangements that were approved in the context of race-
based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause as articulated by the Supreme Court
in Sweatt, which required "substantial equality and educational opportunities." Id. (Phillips,
J., dissenting). Judge Phillips observed that "[tihough race is a 'suspect' classification and
gender so far is not, I see no reason why the same requirement of substantial equality of
benefits that was thought at one time to justify separate-but-equal schools for different races
should not apply to separate schools for men and women if that classification now does, as
race formerly but no longer does, permit separate but equal arrangements." Id. (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
123. Although Judge Phillips acknowledged some difference between strict scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, he found the distinction to be a very
narrow one. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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muster" because "[i]t could not provide substantially equal educational
benefits or opportunities to both genders.""25
VI. VMI in the Supreme Court
In United States v. Virginia,2 the U.S. Supreme Court granted the
federal government's petition for certiorari," which challenged the decision
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Commonwealth's higher education system as presently
constituted with its predominantly coeducational emphasis and with its
single-sex components for men and women.
The U.S. Justice Department's petition for certiorari asked the Court to
use the VMI case as a vehicle for declaring that actions that discriminate on
the basis of sex should be subject to the same strict constitutional scrutiny
that the court applies to official distinctions on the basis of race. In its briefs
before the Supreme Court, the government reiterated the position it had
taken throughout the litigation that the Commonwealth be ordered to admit
women to VMI or to discontinue funding for VMI.
The Court also granted the Commonwealth's conditional cross-petition
for certiorari, which challenged the initial determination by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals that Virginia could not continue VMII as a male-
only public college without establishing a comparable facility for women.
In its cross-petition, the Commonwealth argued that the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence does not require the Commonwealth to
provide the VWIL program and that the Fourth Circuit's ruling in VMi I
"will unduly and unnecessarily inhibit states in the development of programs
to meet the special and demonstrated needs of their citizens.""
125. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips remarked:
[Even] if every good thing projected for the VWIL program is realized in reasonably
foreseeable time, it will necessarily be then but a pale shadow of VMI in terms of the
great bulk, if not all of those criteria. Particularly is this obvious with respect to the
intangible such as prestige, tradition and alumni influence which the Supreme Court,
looking for substantial equality of educational opportunities in Sweatt, thought 'more
important' even than the tangible resources.
Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
126. 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
127. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 281, 281 (1995).
128. Cross-Petitioners' Brief, supra note 77, at 3. The Commonwealth argued in its
cross-petition that the court of appeals ruling in VMI I
has the effect of precluding government-sponsored single-sex education for students of
one gender, absent a parallel program for students of the other gender. That standard
does not permit states to take into account the pedagogical value of single-sex education
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Although it challenged the court of appeals decision in VMI I, the
Commonwealth stated that, regardless of the position taken in the cross-
petition, it was committed by legislation to single-sex education as a benefi-
cial pedagogical option for both men and women and intended to continue
offering this option through VMI and VWIL even if the Supreme Court held
that parallel programs are not a prerequisite to a state's ability to offer the
benefits of single-sex education to its citizens.129
During oral arguments held before the Supreme Court on January 17,
1996, most of the Justices seemed skeptical of the constitutionality of Vir-
ginia's system of higher education as presently constituted, and the questions
posed by the Justices during oral arguments indicated little support for the
alternative women's program at Mary Baldwin College.
Justice Ginsburg's pessimism over the Commonwealth's higher educa-
tion policy was particularly strident."s At one point during the arguments,
she remarked that women in the military are afait accompli and that "men
better get used to taking orders from women." ' Counsel for the federal
government argued in response to a question posed by Justice O'Connor that
a separate women's program, even one designed to duplicate an all-male
VMI, "wouldn't work" because it would continue to deny women "the
opportunity to show they can succeed" at VMI itself."
Counsel for the Commonwealth stressed at the argument that, should
the Justices rule against VMI in this case, they might well be condemning all
single-sex education, including private, single-sex institutions that receive
government benefits such as tax-exempt status and student financial aid. 1
for some students, the differing educational needs and interest of students, the judgment
of educators in developing programs, the overall mix of educational options made
available to students in the public and private sectors, or the importance of state and
local discretion in devising beneficial and effective means of education for students of
both genders within the financial constraints imposed on funding for education.
Id.
129. Id. at 3 n.1. The Commonwealth reasoned in its cross-petition that it is "merely
seek[ing] to preserve the discretion of state and local governments to improve and diversify
all levels of their educational systems through innovative and successful programs similar to
those of VMI and VWIL." Id.
130. Justice Ginsburg staked out her position on equal protection early in her tenure on
the Supreme Court, writing in Harris v. Forklift, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), that "it remains an
open question whether 'classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.'" Id. at 373
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
131. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, United States v. Virginia (Nos.
94-1941, 94-2107), 1996 WL 16020, at *26-*27 (Jan. 17, 1996).
132. Id. at *29.
133. Id. at *35-*36.
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When asked whether the newly established VWIL program would also be
rendered unconstitutional if the Court were to strike down VMI's all-male
admissions policy and order coeducation, counsel for the Commonwealth
responded that such a ruling by the Court as to VMI's all-male admissions
policy would effectively render the VWIL program unconstitutional as well.
Justice O'Connor, however, was unpersuaded that the issue posed was an
all-or-nothing proposition, stating that "we are only deciding issues in this
case, on these facts."
Justice Souter remarked that serving distinctiveness cannot in and of
itself justify VMI's admissions policy, and Justice Breyer followed up by
stating that, under the Commonwealth's rationale, people of different races
or ethnic backgrounds could be excluded on the ground that their presence
would change a distinctive environment.1" Justice Breyer stated that the test
under intermediate scrutiny requires a state to show why it is important for
VMI to remain an all-male institution and that the state must point to what
it is that is so important "about this hard-to-grasp adversative kind of thing
that enables you to say to women who want to go there 'you can't come. ' "
Counsel for the Commonwealth replied that the expert opinions presented in
the case indicated that the "young men who want a single-sex education
succeed in that [adversative] environment" and that the VWIL program "will
produce the same results. "136
As for the Justice Department's urging of the adoption of the strict
scrutiny standard to assay the VMI case, the Justices - especially Justice
Scalia - appeared almost as skeptical of this contention as they were of the
Commonwealth's policy of providing diversity in its higher education offer-
ings. 137 Under questioning, counsel for the United States departed from the
Justice Department's urging the adoption of strict scrutiny in gender discrim-
ination cases and argued that the application of a strict scrutiny standard to
this case was not necessary for the United States to prevail.' 38
VII. Discussion
A. Equal Protection Analysis
The VMI case is interesting because it demonstrates several different
ways in which the courts have struggled with the Supreme Court's newly
created application of the Equal Protection Clause to gender classifications.
134. Id. at *49-*51.
135. Id. at *12.
136. Id. at *55.
137. Id. at *12-*13.
138. Id. at *11-*12.
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As one commentator observed, the district court in VMI I attempted to inject
some flexibility into the intermediate scrutiny test in order to reflect the
practical and historical factors surrounding single-sex -education and the
evolution of the Court's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.' The
Fourth Circuit, in VMI I, developed a modified intermediate scrutiny
analysis that also attempts to impart some flexibility to the intermediate
scrutiny equal protection analysis. Judge Phillips, in his dissent in VMI II,
adhered to the Court's articulated test for resolving constitutional cases
involving gender discrimination.
The case for a reassessment of the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence in the context of gender-based classifications is particularly
strong when viewed against the backdrop of the VMI case. As Professor
Ides aptly states, "By focusing exclusively on the absence of an all-female
VMI-style institution or program, the question overlooks a much more
significant and complicated question - the one that really ought to be most
pertinent: Overall, does the system of higher education provided by the
Commonwealth of Virginia discriminate on the basis of gender?"'" As an
analogy, Professor Ides offers:
If a state university fields a Division I all-male football team, a challenge to
the legality of that practice would not turn on whether the university spon-
sored an identical women's team, but on whether the university provided
women with equivalent opportunities to engage in interscholastic athletics.
Similarly, in the context of the VMI case, the question is not whether the
state provides an all-female version of VMI, but whether the Common-
wealth provides equivalent opportunities in higher education for women.'
Clearly, if the Equal Protection Clause requires a women's school
identical to VIf, the Commonwealth's remedial plan fails for the very
reasons asserted by Judge Phillips in his dissent. 42 As the Justice Depart-
139. See Ides, supra note 57, at 38-39.
140. Id. at 45.
141. Id. The legislative branch has given its imprimatur to preservation of single-sex
private schools, and statutory enactment has provided a possible rationale for the courts to
preserve the historically single-sex public schools. In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the
Education Amendments, which prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). Although Title
IX prohibits institutions receiving federal funds from denying admission to a person based on
gender, the drafters took care to exempt certain institutions from the statute's prohibitions.
Id. In particular, the Act exempts "any public institution of undergraduate higher education
which is an institution that traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a
policy of admitting only students of one sex." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1994).
142. See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Phillips's dissent
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ment stressed repeatedly throughout VMI I, no parallel program could
possibly capture the same experience and benefits that VMI's 157 years of
history and accomplished alumni have added to the institution. A parallel
institution simply cannot duplicate the intangible factors such as VMI's
alumni network, reputation, tradition, and history. Thus, an all-female
VMI-type institution would be per se separate and unequal.
Judge Phillips's logic, however, is not compelling. A new VMI-type
experience for women would be separate and unequal, not in the sense that
an all-female education is inferior to an all-male education but simply
because "new" is not identical to "old." Such a stilted test delivers its own
answer regardless of the facts or law. Further, although casting the issue in
separate but unequal verbiage appears to endow the government's argument
with the moral force of Brown v. Board of Education, an actual reading of
Brown underscores the illegitimacy of this approach.
In Brown, the Supreme Court made clear that the touchstone of constitu-
tional infirmity embodied by a separate but equal educational experience was
the inherent inferiority of all-black schools. "To separate [Negro students]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 43 In
stark contrast, the VWIL program, like other public and private all-female
schools, is designed to produce leadership and character in women in a
manner superior to coeducational institutions. Thus, a rigid application of
intermediate scrutiny to require identical education for all, instead of to
proscribe inferior education for some, ignores both the consent of the
national and state electorate and the logic of Brown itself.
Moreover, unlike the separate but equal argument rejected in Brown
v. Board of Education, the allowance of all-male and all-female state schools
would not be inherently unequal because of the political under-representation
of the challengers. Because the current majority of the electorate is com-
posed of women, women in the 1990s, unlike blacks in the 1950s, have the
political power to choose whether to support a state's single-sex education. 44
Further, unlike the black students of the 1950s, who were legally barred
from choosing coracial education, women students of the 1990s are free to
choose a single-sex or coeducational education. Justice Powell, dissenting
in Hogan, drew the distinction between sexual segregation in education and
the separate but equal racial segregation typified by the decision in Plessy v.
in VMI II).
143. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasis added).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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Ferguson," noting that "[ilt was characteristic of racial segregation that
segregated facilities were offered, not as alternatives to increase the choices
available to blacks, but as the sole alternative." This is distinguishable from
public single-sex colleges in which students are "free to select a coeduca-
tional environment for themselves if they so desire; their attendance at [a
single-sex institution] is not a matter of coercion."" A flexible intermediate
scrutiny test would thus preserve the intrinsic legitimacy of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as applied, protect the political power of women, and allow
female students to exercise their own choices in the inherently personal and
intimate decision about the educational experience to which they will commit
four years of their lives.
In the context of VMI and VWIL, the Court should look to the broader
menu of educational opportunities that the Commonwealth offers at the
college level and focus on whether comparable single-sex educational oppor-
tunities exist for men and women. Such a flexible, or "pro-choice," version
of intermediate scrutiny would allow women to choose superior leadership
training or opt for the traditional coeducational experience. The use of such
a flexible intermediate scrutiny test that views the Commonwealth's system
of higher education as a whole would have the benefit of retaining some of
the intrinsic validity of the Equal Protection Clause as it was ratified and
before the courts added their judicial gloss to the clause. The policy decision
of whether to provide all-male and all-female education would still rest with
the state legislatures. Thus, the Supreme Court would not mandate by
judicial fiat that a type of education that existed both before and after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and after the Equal Rights Amendment
was rejected, is now unconstitutional.
B. Implications for Single-Sex Institutions
VMI and the Citadel are the only state-supported, all-male military
colleges in the nation, and the Justice Department has sued them both over
their admissions policies. By focusing on the military aspect of VMI, one
could overlook the overarching implications of the VMI case for public and
private nonmilitary institutions. As one commentator has observed:
The introduction of public funds into the dispute highlights and aggravates all
of the other criticisms because it legitimizes an educational method, which is
grounded in the necessity of segregating the sexes, with a governmental stamp
of approval. However, publicly-supported single-sex school is the best,
145. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
146. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 741 n.9 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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perhaps only, way to ensure that all students, especially those who cannot
afford to attend private schools, can gain from the educational experience. 47
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, a prominent feminist scholar and expert
witness for the Commonwealth in VMI II, emphasized at the remedial trial
the particular benefit of single-sex education for students who come from
lower income families. However, it may be more than those students who
cannot afford to attend private single-sex institutions who will be denied the
option to attend single-sex colleges if VMI's all-male admissions policy is
struck down. A major issue that may emerge if VMI and the Citadel are
forced to admit women is the fate of private women's colleges in America.
VMI's potential destruction is a commentary on all single-sex education.
The controversy over VMI's all-male admissions policy is not an isolated
problem, but reflects an emerging trend in this country toward conformity
and sameness. The VMI litigation embodies the quintessential symbolic
lawsuit. As one of the last remaining public single-sex institutions, VMI
represents a last line of defense against those who wish to challenge the
gender discrimination at private women's colleges.
The distinction between public and private in the realm of state action
is illusory, and there is no precise test for finding state action.141 As one
commentator notes, "In the last decade, the Supreme Court has found that
public/private distinctions may be blurred in the context of higher educa-
tion."149 For example, although VMI receives approximately 30% of its
operating budget from the Commonwealth, Hollins College, a private
women's college in Roanoke, receives approximately 20% of its operating
budget from the Commonwealth.150 As a commentator has noted, "Individu-
als and entities, at one time considered private, now find themselves in
jeopardy of falling into the public sphere as a result of very minimal contact
with state government."' Further, "The uncertainty associated with the
scope of state action threatens the status of all private women's colleges.
Today, private institutions and their students depend significantly upon state
and federal funding. Private women's schools receive approximately 20%
147. Caplice, supra note 59, at 228.
148. Ronna G. Schneider, State Action - Making Sense out of Chaos - an Historical
Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 737 (1985).
149. Brian Scott Yablonski, Marching to the Beat of a Different Drummer: The Case of
the Virginia Military Institute, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1449, 1476 (1993).
150. Suzanne Fields, Assault on VMI Could Bacg7re on Feminists, ATLANTA J. &
CoNsT., Oct. 8, 1992, at A12.
151. Yablonski, supra note 148, at 1482 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that requisite state action existed where private restaurant that
discriminated against Blacks leased space from government parking lot)).
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of their operating costs from government entities.""5 The Commonwealth
provides over $38 million in state financial assistance to five private single-
sex colleges for women and one private single-sex college for men. In
addition, most states, including Virginia, provide loans to students attending
private institutions of higher learning through tuition assistance grant pro-
grams-" According to the Virginia Council on Higher Education report for
1986-87, female students received $109 million in state support, while male
students received approximately $91 million. 14
VIII. Conclusion
The case of VMI is indeed a perplexing one. In VMI II, the lower
courts attempted to harmonize the Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny test
with the justifications and benefits of single-sex education as embodied in
VMI's all-male admissions policy. In the field of education, the strict
scrutiny test, which the Court used to strike down racially segregated school
systems, emerges from an entirely different set of imperatives than those
underlying the intermediate scrutiny test. The Court struck down separate
but equal racially segregated schools because of their inherent inferiority.
No similar imperative exists with regard to single-sex schools that have been
shown to be highly beneficial to many students. Because the evolution of the
equal protection intermediate scrutiny test has gravitated toward the stricter
scrutiny standard used to assay racial classifications rather than toward the
rational basis standard used to assay nonsuspect classifications, the Court's
current permutation of the intermediate scrutiny test is inappropriate for
evaluating single-sex schools.
The Court should develop a more flexible approach to equal protection
challenges based upon gender classifications that, in the context of single-sex
colleges, would take into account a state's entire menu of higher education
options, rather than focusing on a particular institution's policy. Such an
approach would allow states to continue to offer publicly funded single-
sex opportunities in higher education, which have been shown to be success-
ful methods for educating men and women. Notwithstanding Justice
O'Connor's remark at oral argument suggesting that the Court would issue
a holding confined to VMI, as one of the last public, single-sex institutions
left in the country, VMI's fate may be a portent for the future of all single-
sex schools as the public/private distinction in institutions of higher educa-
tion blurs.
152. Id. (citing Fields, supra note 150, at A12).
153. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 23-38.12 (Michie 1993).
154. An All-Male VMI, WASH. POsT, Nov. 7, 1992, at A22.
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